This tool recomputes the published result with the certified
Sephos verifier, entirely in your browser. It trusts no server: a green result means the certified
core recomputed the published audit bundle and returned valid. Any error — a failed
fetch, a hash mismatch, a rejected package — shows NOT VERIFIED.
Offline, or the host blocks cross-origin fetches? Download
audit_package_redacted.json from the published bundle and load it directly:
The trustees' key-generation (DKG) can exclude a misbehaving trustee. This check recomputes that verdict with the certified verifier: it confirms every excluded trustee was excluded for cause — exactly what the §17.4 blame rules produce from the signed complaints and revealed shares — and never on a server's say-so. The transcript is bound to the package verified above: its trustee-signed key-ceremony result must be the same one this package carries, so a valid transcript from a different ceremony can never make this green. When the published bundle carries no dispute transcript, a clean ceremony is one that excluded no one (a signed exclusion with no transcript is NOT VERIFIED); more than one published transcript is ambiguous and is NOT VERIFIED.
From your acceptance receipt. This check runs against the ledger and keys of the package verified above (a green universal verdict is the anchor — nothing here comes from an unverified server response). It proves your ballot is recorded-as-cast in the signed, published ledger; it never reveals your choice.
Réservé aux auditeurs qualifiés (owner/trustee) détenant le bundle téléchargé via l'endpoint restreint ; vérification 100% offline.
This check never fetches anything and never authenticates: load the eligibility
bindings file you already downloaded, and the certified verifier recomputes it against
the bundle's own embedded anchors (its eligibilityRoot and
verifiedRegistrationBindingSetHash), entirely on your machine — this proves the
bundle is internally self-consistent, not that those anchors match what was published. The
qualified auditor must separately confirm the bundle's eligibilityRoot /
verifiedRegistrationBindingSetHash equal those in the independently published,
creator-signed eligibility_manifest (the universal audit path).
Don't trust this tool either: verify the
verifier — check the served wasm against the pinned certified build, and get the
rebuild-from-source recipe (crypto/PROVENANCE.md).